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COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DEFERENCE 
TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION 
ANTIDUMPING DETERMINATIONS: AN 
EMPIRICAL LOOK 
THOMAS P. ONDECK1 
MICHAEL A. LAWRENCE2 
This Article investigates the Court of International Trade's 
review of International Trade Commission and Department of 
Commerce International Trade Administration antidumping 
determinations. Although the relevant statutes make no distinc-
tion between the court's standard of review for ITC versus 
Department of Commerce decisions, this Article concludes, on 
the basis of an empirical examination of 268 CIT antidumping 
decisions since 1985, that the CIT gives slightly greater defer-
ence to ITC determinations than to Commerce determinations, 
and offers some thoughts on why this may be so. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States antidumping law imposes dumping duties on the 
sale of foreign goods in the United States "at less than its fair value,,3 
when an industry in the United States is "materially injured or is 
threatened with material injury,,4 by reason of those sales. Two govern-
ment entities, the International Trade Commission (ITC)5 and the 
Department of Commerce International Trade Administration (Com-
merce),6 are responsible for conducting the investigation in antidump-
I. Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C. 
2. Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C. 
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988). 
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1988). 
5. The United States International Trade Commission was created by Congress as part of the 
Revenue Act of 1916, as the "United States Tariff Commission." Ch. 463, § 700,39 Stat. 756, 795. 
The current ITC has broadened responsibilities. The Commission is headed by six Commissioners 
who serve for nine-year terms (or less, if appointed to serve out an unexpired term). 
6. The International Trade Administration was created within the Department of Commerce 
by Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1979, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3396, under the authority granted to the 
President by § 1109 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Pub. L. No. 96--39, 93 Stat. 144,314. In 
addition to administering the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the International Trade 
Administration maintains commercial and economic information on foreign countries and gives 
advice to the President on international economic policy issues. 
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ing proceedings. The investigation may go through as many as four 
distinct phases: (I) the ITC preliminary injury investigation, (2) the 
Commerce preliminary dumping investigation, (3) the Commerce final 
dumping investigation, and (4) the ITC final injury investigation. 7 
An interested party in an antidumping proceeding may obtain judicial 
review in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) of any 
ITC or Commerce determination which terminates or concludes an 
investigation or an administrative review.8 Regarding this review by the 
CIT, one sometimes hears the opinion expressed in the trade bar that 
the CIT gives greater deference to ITC determinations than to Com-
merce determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. 
There is no basis in the statute for this perception-in fact, the statute 
and legislative history do not differentiate between the deference the 
CIT shall give the two entities-nevertheless, the perception exists. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine whether there is a basis for 
the perception that the CIT gives the ITC greater deference than 
Commerce, and if so, why this different treatment might exist. The 
Article looks empirically at 268 CIT antidumping decisions over the past 
seven years9 and finds that there is a statistical difference between the 
rate at which the CIT has upheld ITC determinations and the rate at 
which it has upheld Commerce determinations. The difference-60.6% 
of ITC determinations upheld as compared to 53.8% for Commerce-is 
not huge, but does support the conclusion that, for whatever reason, the 
CIT has given marginally more deference to ITC than to Commerce 
determinations. 
Section II of the Article provides an overview of the antidumping law 
as it specifically applies to the Court of International Trade's deference 
to ITC and Commerce decisions, and discusses the legislative history 
and scholarly commentary relating to the deference issue. Section III 
outlines the methodology of the empirical survey and discusses the data. 
This section also conducts a judge-by-judge breakdown, which yields 
some interesting results. Finally, Section IV offers thoughts on why the 
CIT might give greater deference to ITC decisions than to Commerce 
decisions. 
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b, 1673d (1988). See infta notes 10-22 and accompanying text. 
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (c) (1988). CIT decisions may then be appealed as 
of right to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988). 
The CAFC was known as the Customs and Claims Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA) until 1982, 
when the CCPA was abolished and the CAFC was created. Pub. L. No. 97-164 §§ 122, 127,96 Stat. 
25,36--37, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988). 
9. The survey encompasses the period fromJan. I, 1986, through Mar. 31, 1993. 
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II. THE ANTIDUMPING LAw 
A. The Statute 
An antidumping duty proceeding begins administratively when Com-
merce determines that an investigation is warranted, or when an 
interested party files an antidumping petition. 10 Then, Commerce and 
the ITC conduct a two-step administrative proceeding (preliminary and 
final determination) lasting nine months to one year. Within forty-five 
days of the petition's filing, the ITC must issue its preliminary determi-
nation stating whether there is a "reasonable indication" that a domes-
tic industry has been materially injured or threatened with material 
injury by reason of the subject imports. II The ITC preliminary investiga-
tion includes a hearing at which the importer, exporter, petitioner, and 
other parties with a stake in the outcome may present evidence. The 
Commission staff, rather than the Commissioners themselves, usually 
conducts the hearing, which is typically less formal than a trial. 12 After 
the Commissioners have had an opportunity to review the staff's find-
ings from the investigation, they vote on the "reasonable indication" 
issue, with a majority vote of six commissioners controlling. If the ITC 
finds that there is no reasonable indication of such injury, the investiga-
tion ends-there is no antidumping violation. 13 
Commerce is responsible for determining the sufficiency of the peti-
tion and whether imports are being sold in the United States at less than 
fair value (LTFV).14 At the preliminary stage, Commerce issues detailed 
questionnaires to the affected foreign producers seeking information 
about such items as home-market sales, sales to the United States, and 
all expenses connected with those sales for a six-month period up to and 
including the month in which the petition was filed. 15 Based on the data 
it receives from the responses to the questionnaire, Commerce calcu-
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (1988). For purposes of the statute, an "interested party" would include 
a domestic manufacturer; a producer or wholesaler of a like product; a labor union or other worker 
group representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production or wholesaling of a 
like product; or a trade association whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a like 
product in the United States. A foreign party cannot file an antidumping petition. 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1673a(b)(I), 1677(9) (1988). 
II. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1988). 
12. 19C.F.R. §§ 207.115, 201.13 (1993). 
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1988). 
14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673(1), 1673b(b) (1988). 
15. 19 C.F.R. § 353.31 (1993). This six-month period is known as the "period of investigation" 
(POI). 
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lates a "preliminary dumping margin,"16 which is published in the 
Federal Register. Commerce's preliminary determination is due within 
160 days of the petition's filing.17 
Barring an extension of the statutory deadline,18 Commerce must 
issue its final dumping determination within seventy-five days after the 
date of its preliminary determination. 19 Following the preliminary 
determination, Commerce conducts a "verification," whereby Com-
merce employees travel to the foreign producer's home country facilities 
to examine the producer's records. 20 The purpose of this procedure is to 
verify the accuracy of the facts and figures that had been submitted to 
Commerce in the producer's questionnaire response. 
Finally, the ITC must issue its final injury determination 120 days 
after the Commerce preliminary determination.21 The final determina-
tions of both Commerce and the ITC must be affirmative in order for 
there to be an antidumping violation and the imposition of an antidump-
ing duty order requiring the assessment of dumping duties. 22 
While Commerce's preliminary and final determinations set the 
amount of estimated duties, actual dumping duties are calculated by 
Commerce in an "annual administrative review" when requested by an 
"interested party,,23 or when Commerce determines that changed cir-
cumstances warrant a review.24 In such a review, Commerce sends a 
questionnaire to the foreign producer similar to that sent during the 
16. Although the proceeding continues regardless of Commerce's preliminary determination, 
an affirmative preliminary determination has an immediate impact on the foreign producer against 
whom it is assessed; i.e., there will be a "suspension ofliquidation" of all merchandise covered by the 
preliminary determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1988). In such cases, Customs will not make a 
final determination of duty payable on entered goods covered by the suspension of liquidation until 
the antidumping case is resolved. Customs will release the goods to the importer only after he posts 
a bond for the possible duties payable on the goods. 
17. 19U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(I) (1988). 
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(2) (1988); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.15(b)-(e) (1993). 
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l) (1988). 
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.36 (1993). If there are inaccuracies in the 
questionnaire response, Commerce is authorized to use the "best information available." 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.37. Commerce uses such information, which often consists merely of the petitioner's 
allegations, on the theory that if the actual facts were better than the allegations, the foreign 
producer would have submitted those facts. Because the use of "best information available" can 
have disastrous results for the foreign producer, Commerce can-and does-use its power to 
compel full compliance with its questionnaires and deadlines. 
21. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(b)(2), (3) (1988). 
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). Absent good cause shown, the antidumping duty order cannot be 
revoked for at least two years after imposition. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1988). 
23. 19C.F.R. § 353.22(a) (1993). 
24. 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(1) (1993). 
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initial investigation in order to solicit sales information for U.S. and 
home-market sales for the particular period covered. To the extent the 
actual dumping duty calculated in the review differs from the estimated 
duty deposit collected pursuant to the antidumping duty order,25 the 
difference, with interest, is refunded or charged to the importer.26 
In the event an annual administrative review for a given period is not 
requested, the Customs Service simply keeps the duty deposits, treating 
them as though they are the actual dumping duties due.27 Producers 
that receive high dumping margins in an investigation very often take 
advantage of the annual reviews to attempt to get their dumping duty 
rates revised. If, for example, a company is able to reduce a dumping 
rate from twenty percent to one percent or zero in an antidumping 
review, the antidumping duty order will be an irritant, but not necessar-
ilya barrier, to its making sales to the United States. 
B. Judicial Review 
The antidumping statute permits an interested party who participates 
in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding to obtain judicial 
review of any determination which terminates or concludes an investiga-
tion or an administrative review. 28 A party may seek review in the CIT,29 
whose decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC).30 The standard of judicial review in antidumping duty 
cases is identical for the ITC and Commerce. For certain appealable 
determinations, the standard is whether the determination is "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.,,31 For certain other appealable determinations, 
the standard is whether the determination is "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.,,32 
25. 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1993). 
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1677g (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.24 (1993). If the goods are entered before the 
antidumping duty order issues, however, the importer will not be required to pay the difference if 
the final estimated rate is higher than the preliminary rate. 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 
353.23 (1993). 
27. 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(e) (1993). 
28. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988). 
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a; 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988). 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)( I) (B) (1988). Such determinations include, among others, affirmative 
or negative final determinations by either Commerce or the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § ISI6a(a)(2) (1988). 
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(I)(A) (1988). Such determinations include Commerce determina-
tions not to initiate an investigation and negative preliminary determinations by either the ITC or 
Commerce. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(I) (1988). 
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As noted, the statutory standard of review is the same whether the 
action is against the ITC or Commerce. The statute simply makes no 
distinction-the language effectively lumps the ITC and Commerce 
together when it specifies how the court shall review the actions brought 
against Commerce or the Commission.33 
The legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 gives no 
indication that Congress intended that the Court ofInternational Trade 
should give more deference to ITC determinations. In its report on the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the House Ways & Means Committee 
stated that " [a] final affirmative determination by the Authority or the 
ITC may not be reviewed until after the publication .... The record 
before the court ... will consist of all information presented to, or 
obtained by, the Authority or the ITC . ... ,,34 The Senate Finance 
Committee's report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 explicitly 
states that one of the reasons for the bill is to 
remove all doubt on whether de novo review is appropriate by 
excluding de novo review from consideration as a standard in 
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations .... The 
amendments ... provide all parties with greater rights of par tic i-
pat ion at the administrative level and increased access to infor-
mation upon which the decision of the administering authority and 
the International Trade Commission are based . .. [and] have elimi-
nated any need for de novo review.35 
Nor do the legislative histories of subsequent trade acts, such as the 
1984 Trade and Tariff Act36 or the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness 
Act,37 distinguish between the deference to be given by the reviewing 
court to ITC and Commerce determinations. The 1984 House Ways & 
Means Committee report simply says that the purpose of the changes to 
the statute is to "clarify the treatment of certain types of final determi-
nations and to clarify when judicial review of these determinations 
should occur,,,38 and the 1988 Act did not address judicial review. 
33. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a), (b) (1988). 
34. H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt.2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 784 
(emphasis added). 
35. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 637 
(emphasis added). 
36. Pub. L. No. 98--573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered sections of 18--19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
37. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
38. H.R. REP. No. 267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5174. 
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In short, neither the statute nor the legislative history give any 
indication that Congress intended that the reviewing court should give 
more deference to the ITC over Commerce, or vice-versa. We are left to 
the literature and a review of the cases to attempt to discern whether 
there is a de facto distinction between judicial deference given the ITC 
versus Commerce. 
C. Scholarly Commentary 
The literature has given scant coverage to the perception that the 
reviewing courts may give ITC determinations greater deference than 
Commerce determinations. Articles that do touch upon the issue imply 
that such a perception is justified. A recent Fordham International Law 
Journal article asserts, for example, that "the ITC has rarely been 
overturned by the Court ofInternational Trade.,,39 Another commenta-
tor states that "the ITC is probably more deserving of judicial deference 
given its superior resources.,,40 Although neither of these articles pro-
vided authority for their suggestions, they are useful nonetheless in 
demonstrating that there is a belief "out there" that the ITC deserves 
or receives greater deference from the CIT and CAFC than does 
Commerce. 
In a pair of articles published in the mid-1980s, one commentator 
went so far as to advocate that the CIT and then-CCPA formally adopt a 
no deference standard of review for both Commerce and ITC determina-
tions.41 The author, stating that such a change was necessary to firmly 
establish the courts (particularly the Federal Circuit) as expert tribu-
nals in the field of international trade law,42 wondered if ITC and ITA 
39. David A. Hartquist et ai., Toward a Fuller Appreciation qf Nonacquiescence, Collateral Estoppel and 
Stare Decisis in the U.S. Court qf International Trade, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 112, 130 (1990-91). See irifra 
notes 86-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of this article. 
40. Kevin C. Kennedy, Abandoning the Deference Rule in ITC Interpretations qfthe Antidumping Du~y 
Law, 14 SYRACUSE]. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 22 (1987) [hereinafter Abandoning the Deference Rule]. 
This author opined, however, that the CAFC actually subjected the lTC's interpretations to 
stricter scrutiny than to those of Commerce, and that this outcome was counterintuitive given the 
lTC's superior resources. Id. 
41. /d. at 21-22; Kevin C. Kennedy, Judicial Review qf Commerce Department Antidumping Dury 
Determinations: Deference or Abdication?, II N.C.]. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 19 (1986). 
42. Further justification offered by the author for the no deference rule included consideration 
of the effect such an explicit standard would have on Commerce and the ITC "should they become 
emboldened by the deference rule to stray far afield of congressional intent. Adoption of a no 
deference standard of review would send a message to those agencies that they are not superior to 
courts in the interpretation of the antidumping duty statute while reaffirming that statutory 
interpretation is quintessentially and ultimately a judicial, not an administrative function." 
1993] 113 
HeinOnline -- 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 114 1993-1994
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
(Commerce) determinations are "entitled to great judicial deference, 
why [would Congress] expose such determinations twice to the gauntlet 
of judicial review?,,43 Moreover, the author asserted that the legislative 
history of the Customs Court Act of 198044 supported his argument that 
Congress intended that the reviewing courts give little or no deference 
to ITC or Commerce determinations.45 However, the Senate Financing 
Committee's report on the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, quoted 
above,46 negates this argument. The report stated that one of the 
reasons for the bill was to "remove all doubt on whether de novo review is 
appropriate by excluding de novo review from consideration as a standard 
in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.,,47 
III. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DECISIONS 
A. The Methodology 
One way to discern whether the Court of International Trade gives 
greater defacto deference to ITC than to Commerce determinations is to 
examine empirically CIT decisions over the last several years. By 
tabulating the number of times the court upheld ITC decisions versus 
the number of times it remanded them, and then comparing that data 
to similar data for Commerce, it is possible to get an idea whether there 
is a statistical basis for the proposition that the court gives greater 
deference to the ITC.48 
Abandoning the D'!ftrence Rule, supra note 40, at 37 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) 
(courts are "final authorities on issues of statutory construction")). 
43. Abandoning the D'!ftrence Rule, supra note 40 at 33. The twin gauntlet to which the author 
refers is the Federal Circuit's practice of reviewing ITC or Commerce determinations "as if no 
review had taken place at the Court of International Trade." /d. at 32 (quoting Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. 
United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We review that court's review of an ITC 
determination by applying anew the statute's express judicial review standard.")). 
44. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980). 
45. The House Report on the 1980 Act stated: "The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates a 
comprehensive system of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transaction, utilizing 
the specialized expertise of the [Court of International Trade] and the [Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit]." H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3729. 
46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
47. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 637. 
48. It is important to understand at the outset that any empirical study contains inherent 
biases and potential for manipulation. In this case, the main potential for bias lies in the 
fundamentally different nature of the Department of Commerce and ITC determinations, as 
described in Part IV below. For example, Commerce determinations generally involve more factual 
questions than do ITC determinations, which leads to a situation where the CIT might 
114 [Vol. 25 
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For each separate antidumping case49 the court reviewed since 1985, 
the survey simply asked whether the court affirmed the ITC or Com-
merce determination in its entirety. If this question was answered in the 
affirmative, a check mark was placed in the "affirmed/upheld" column. 
If, on the other hand, the court overturned or remanded any part of the 
determination,50 the surveyor placed a check mark in the "overturned/ 
remanded" column. Subsequently, the numbers were totaled and the 
percentages calculated to arrive at the final figures. 51 
B. The Results 
The Court of International Trade reviewed 268 antidumping cases 
from January 1986 through March 1993. Of the 197 reviews of Com-
merce decisions, the court upheld the Commerce determination in 106 
instances (53.8%). By contrast, the court reviewed seventy-one ITC 
decisions,52 and upheld the Commission's determination in forty-three 
of those decisions (60.6%). The difference between the two figures 
(53.8% versus 60.6%) is not great, but it is sufficient to provide support 
for the perception that the Court of International Trade as a whole 
defers slightly more to the ITC than to Commerce. 
It is useful in understanding the court's interpretation of its standard 
of review in antidumping cases to examine several of the surveyed cases 
in greater detail. Therefore, this article will consider four different 
situations: an occasion when the court upheld an ITC determination, 
remand just one of many aspects ofa Commerce determination while upholding all the rest. This is 
in contrast to the lTC, whose determinations typically involve more judgment questions and hence 
do not lend themselves to as many "potentially appealable issues." 
Potential distortions notwithstanding, a survey such as this that examines the Court of 
International Trade's tendencies over time to uphold determinations in their entirety or remand! 
overturn them for any reason gives some indication of the court's propensity to defer to the entities 
making the determinations. 
49. In the interest of keeping the survey's focus narrow enough so as to provide meaningful 
information, the survey excluded CIT cases involving review of countervailing duty investigations. 
50. Determinations that were remanded for the sole purpose of correcting a clerical error or 
computer error were not classified as remands. 
51. It is very possible that the survey would have produced different results had it studied only 
decisions from the last year, or only from the period from 1988 to 1990, or only from any number of 
possible time parameters. The authors examined as many decisions as was manageable, investigat-
ing as far back in time as feasible given the available resources. Accordingly, the survey analyzes all 
CIT antidumping cases from 1986 (inclusive) through March 1993, with the intention that such a 
sample would include anywhere from 200 to 300 cases. 
52. The greater number of Commerce cases is, at least in part, attributable to the fact that 
Commerce has a statutory obligation to conduct annual compliance reviews at the request of an 
interested party. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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upheld a Commerce determination, remanded an ITC determination, 
and remanded a Commerce determination. 
In Calabrian Corp. v. United States,53 decided by Judge Carman, the 
court upheld an ITC negative preliminary injury determination. The 
court concluded that the petitioner failed to carry its burden54 of estab-
lishing that the Commission's determination was "arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.,,55 The 
court held that the ITC did not abuse its discretion in any of four respects: 
(l) in applying the proper legal standard, (2) in finding ... [two 
distinct chemical compounds] to be single like products, (3) in 
declining to take into account the conditions of individual firms 
operating within the domestic industry, and (4) in concluding 
there was no reasonable indication of material injury or threat of 
material injury to the domestic market.56 
In so finding, the court noted that 
Congress has emphasized that review of Commission determina-
tions under the arbitrary and capricious standard is not a de novo 
review . ... [The court's task in review is to] ascertain whether 
there was a rational basis in fact for the determination by the 
administrative decision-maker.57 
While the "inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,,58 under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court acknowledged that "the 
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered 
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.,,59 Accordingly, on the 
facts of the case, the court upheld the ITC. 
53. Calabrian Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 794 F. Supp. 377 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1992). 
54. The court noted that "the decision of ... the International Trade Commission is presumed 
to be correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such decision." 
Id. at 381 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(I)(1988)). 
55. !d. at 380 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(I)(C) and (b)(I)(A) (1988)). As noted above,supra 
note 32 and accompanying text, the proper standard of review for negative preliminary determina-
tions is the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
56. !d. at 379. 
57. !d. at 381 (quoting S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1979))(citing American 
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
58. !d. at 380 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 
285 (1974)). 
59. !d. 
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In Midland Export Ltd. v. United States, 60 decided by Judge Goldberg, the 
CIT considered several issues and found that substantial evidence61 
existed to uphold Commerce's final determination in toto. The court 
considered Commerce's decision to use the highest calculated dumping 
margin as the "best information available,,,62 and its decision to use the 
best information available in finding that India was a significant pro-
ducer of silicon metal. The court asserted that 
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.,,63 [Furthermore,] Commerce 
is given "considerable deference in its interpretation of its 
statutory authority and the methodology employed in the admin-
istration of the antidumping law.,,64 [Commerce's] determina-
tion will not be overturned merely because the plaintiff can 
produce evidence in support of its own contentions and in oppo-
sition to the evidence supporting the agency's determination.65 
On this basis, with respect to the issue of whether India was a significant 
producer of silicon metal, the court found that the "best information 
available" narrowly met the substantial evidence standard: 
[W] hether the record contains substantial evidence ... is a close 
question. The court notes that the record is devoid of the type of 
extensive, and vastly preferable, material available that sup-
ports ... [other affirmed issues in this case]. Nevertheless, the 
court finds that information included in the record shows that 
I d · "fi d 66 n la was a slgm cant pro ucer. ... 
On the other hand, in NSK Ltd. v. United States,67 decided by Judge 
60. No. 92-53 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 8,1992). 
61. As noted above, supra note 31 and accompanying text, the substantial evidence standard is 
the standard to be used for, among other things, Commerce and ITC final determinations. 19 
U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(I)(B) (1988). 
62. See supra note 20. 
63. Midland Export, slip op. at 6 (quoting N.A.R., S.p.A. v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 936, 939 
(1990) (quoting Gold Star Co. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (1988), ajfd, 873 F.2d 
1427 (Fed. Cir. 1989». 
64. !d., slip op. at 7 (quoting Tehnoimportexport v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 
(1991». 
65. !d. (citing Tehnoimportexport, 766 F. Supp. at 1173.) 
66. !d. slip op. at 10. 
67. NSK Ltd. v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 115 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992). 
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Tsoucalas, the CIT found there was not substantial evidence supporting 
Commerce's final determination of an annual administrative review on 
three of the four issues before the court, and remanded those issues to 
the agency. One of the remanded issues involved Commerce's determi-
nation to exclude the plaintiff foreign producer's below-cost sales in its 
calculations of foreign market sales.68 The CIT asserted that, in order to 
satisfy the substantial evidence standard of review on this issue, Com-
merce must include "some discussion on the record as to why the prices 
charged on sales ... will not allow recovery of [the company's] costs in a 
reasonable period of time.' ,,69 Because Commerce only justified why the 
plaintiff's prices would not permit recovery of costs within a reasonable 
period of time in the normal course of trade with a statement that 
plaintiff "did not demonstrate that it would recover the costs of selling 
[its product] below cost within a reasonable period of time,,,70 the court 
found that Commerce's determination was not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record. Accordingly, the court remanded the issue to 
Commerce to "either reconsider the sales made at below-cost or to 
specifically substantiate on the record its determination that costs of 
below-cost sales would not be recovered in the normal course of trade 
within a reasonable period of time.,,7l 
Finally, in Holmes Prods. Corp. v. United States, 72 decided by Judge 
Restani, the CIT remanded the lTC's final affirmative injury determina-
tion, directing the ITC to further explain "the evidence of the nexus 
between imports and injury.,,73 The court implied that, in order to 
satisfy the substantial evidence standard of review in an affirmative 
determination regarding injury to domestic industry, the ITC must 
68. When Commerce determines that the foreign producer's "home market sales have been 
made at or below the cost of production, such sales are disregarded in the calculation of foreign 
market value if the sales '( I) have been made over an extended period of time and in substantial 
quantities, and (2) are not at prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of 
time in the normal course of trade.' "!d. at 118 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § I 677b(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
Generally, the foreign producer will prefer that Commerce use home market sales in 
determining foreign market value, since the alternative is for Commerce to use "constructed 
value," a value which typically is more damaging to the producer's case than is a value derived from 
actual home market sales. 
69. !d. at 118-19 (quoting Toho Titanium Co. v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (1987». 
70. !d. at 119 (quoting Tapered Roller Bearings Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter and 
Certain Components Thereof from Japan, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,720, 38,725 (1990) (final admin. 
review) ). 
71. !d. at119. 
72. Holmes Prods. Corp. v. United States, No. 92-230 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 30, 1992). 
73. !d. slip op. at 2. 
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demonstrate causation between the imports and the injury.74 In its final 
determination, "the only evidence [the ITC] found of the nexus between 
imports and injury to the domestic industry was 'mixed overselling and 
underselling.' ,,75 Stating the ITC must demonstrate that mixed trends 
are sufficient to show causation, and noting that the ITC "discussed 
[pricing information] only in the most general terms,,,76 the court 
determined that the lTC's determination on this issue was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, and remanded the case for 
a more substantive explanation of the nexus between pricing and injury 
to the domestic industry. 
C. The Individual CIT Judges 
It is also interesting to look at the tendencies of the individual CIT 
judges. 77 Six judges-Judges Tsoucalas, Carman, Restani, DiCarlo, 
Aquilino, and Musgrave-decided the great majority of the cases. Judge 
Tsoucalas upheld Commerce in twenty-three of the forty-three cases he 
TABLE A 
Judge Commerce ITC Determinations 
Determinations Upheld 
Upheld 
Tscoucalas 53.5% (23/43) 75.0% (3/4) 
Carman 65.0% (13/20) 61.1 % (II /81) 
Restani 55.6% (30/54) 68.8% (II / 16) 
DiCarlo 58.6% (17/29) 66.7% (10/15) 
Aquilino 42.9% (9/21) 14.3% (1/7) 
Musgrave 66.7% (6/9) 100% (2/2) 
Othersa 38.1 % (8/21) 55.6% (5/9) 
aIncluded in these judges are former Chief Judge Re, Judge Goldberg, 
Senior Judge Watson, and Senior Judge Newman. 
74. /d. slip op. at 8-9. 
75. [d. slip op. at 8. 
76. /d. slip op. at 9. 
77. For ease of reference, the results by individual judge are shown in Table A. 
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heard (53.5%) and upheld three of the four ITC cases he heard (75.0%), 
a differential of 21.5% and the highest among the judges who decided 
more than thirty cases. Judge Carman upheld thirteen of his twenty 
Commerce cases (65.0%) and eleven of the eighteen ITC cases he heard 
(61.1 %).Judge Restani, who heard the most antidumping cases of any of 
the judges (seventy cases), upheld the agency's decision in thirty of the 
fifty-four Commerce cases she heard (55.6%), while upholding the ITC 
in eleven of sixteen cases (68.8%). Judge DiCarlo upheld Commerce in 
seventeen of the twenty-nine cases he heard (58.6%) and the ITC in ten 
of fifteen cases (66.7%).Judge Aquilino upheld the lowest percentage of 
cases overall and individually. He upheld nine of twenty-one Commerce 
cases (42.9%) and only one of seven ITC cases (14.3%). Finally, Judge 
Musgrave upheld six of the nine Commerce cases he heard (66.7%) and 
both of his ITC cases. Others (including former Chief Judge Re, Judge 
Goldberg, Senior Judge Watson, and Senior Judge Newman) accounted 
for the remaining twenty-one Commerce cases, of which they upheld 
eight (38.1 %), and the remaining nine ITC cases, of which they upheld 
five (55.6%). The data for the individual judges shows four of the 
judges-Judges Tsoucalas, Restani, DiCarlo, and Musgrave-and the 
combined "others" upheld ITC determinations a higher percentage of 
the time than Commerce decisions. Only Judges Carman and Aquilino 
did not fit this pattern. 
IV. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE GREATER DEFERENCE 
GIVEN THE ITC 
What might explain the discrepancy between the Court of Interna-
tional Trade's treatment of the ITC and Commerce determinations? 
One answer lies in the composition of the ITC as compared to that of 
Commerce. The ITC is an independent quasi-judicial body comprised of 
six Commissioners who, although appointed by the President, do not 
answer to the executive branch. The Commissioners serve nine-year 
terms, and not more than three of the Commissioners may be of the 
same political party.78 Besides the Commissioners, the ITC consists of a 
staff of commodity specialists, accountants, economists, and attorneys 
who gather relevant facts and prepare reports for the Commissioners' 
use in their decisionmaking. 79 The Commissioners review the evidence 
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988). 
79. THOMAS v. VAKERICS ET AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUlY, AND OTHER TRADE 
ACTIONS 7 (1987). 
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and reports prepared by the staff and hear whatever questions and views 
are expressed by the other Commissioners, but each Commissioner 
ultimately makes his or her own decision independent of the other five. 8o 
A majority in favor of or in opposition to a particular complaint is 
enough for a positive or negative determination, with a tie vote resulting 
in a positive determination. 
The very nature of the lTC, with its quasi-judicial procedure and 
independence from the political branches of government, could explain 
why the CIT judges might consciously or unconsciously give a greater 
measure of deference to ITC determinations. The notion that the lTC's 
independence is a factor in creating the perception that the ITC makes 
its determinations more objectively than Commerce was well expressed 
in a paper presented at the 1992 Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court 
of International Trade by James Toupin, Assistant General Counsel for 
Litigation for the ITC: 
If such determinations were made by an Executive Branch 
decisionmaker, decisions about whether an industry was injured 
by reason of imports would be in danger of being perceived as 
decisions on whether the Executive regarded a specific industry 
as worthy of protection. The Commission scheme isolates ipjury 
determination from this perception of political considerations.81 
By contrast, Commerce does answer to the executive branch. Com-
merce is structured as a typical executive branch agency, with case 
analysts and program managers in the Office of Investigations and 
Office of Compliance,82 two Division Directors in each office, one Office 
Director in each office, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Compliance and 
a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Investigations, and finally, the Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce. Typically, once the investigative team 
comes up with a determination after completing its antidumping inves-
tigation or review, the determination is reviewed in turn through 
Commerce's various levels. In hierarchical organizations, the quality of 
any decision or determination is highly dependent on the capabilities of 
80. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979). 
81. James A. Toupin, Siblings BI!fore the Bench: The International Trade Commission and the 
Department qfCommerce BijOre the Court qfInternational Trade, 25 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 137 (1993). 
82. The Office of Investigation is responsible for conducting antidumping and countervailing 
duty investigations. The Office of Compliance is responsible for ensuring that antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders are properly administered and for conducting administrative review of 
outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders. VAKERlCS ET AL., supra note 79, at 4-5. 
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the people at each step of the process. Some in the trade bar believe that 
Commerce case analysts, "who must shoulder the bulk of the investiga-
tive burden, are often ill-trained and stay too short a time in their 
positions .... As a result, important decisions are in fact made at only 
one of the many review levels, causing delay and redundant analysis.,,83 
Trade attorney Peter O. Suchman, Esq. of the law firm of Powell, 
Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, in an outline presented at the 1992 Court 
ofInternational Trade Conference, suggested that: 
[Commerce] should consider upgrading the case analyst posi-
tion and doing away with much of the vertical review chain. This 
would require recruiting and retaining better qualified person-
nel to actually handle investigations and reviews. In part this 
would be accomplished by assigning "supervisors" to line respon-
sibility.84 
Furthermore, included in Commerce is an office "responsible for 
evaluating public policy considerations and the agency's consistency in 
resolving matters delegated to its discretion. ,,85 It is not surprising, 
given this political mission, that the perception exists that Commerce 
antidumping determinations are something less than totally neutral in 
their objectivity. Given this, it is plausible that the CIT judges might 
consider the ITC more capable of objective decisionmaking than Com-
merce. 
A recent article discusses another reason the CIT may give the ITC 
greater deference.86 The article takes an interesting look at how Com-
merce is becoming increasingly nonacquiescent in Court of Interna-
tional Trade decisions. The authors argue that the CIT should bring 
pressure to bear on Commerce to force it to curtail this practice "so that 
the judiciary's power 'to say what the law is' will remain separate from 
exercises of power by the legislative and executive branches of 
government.,,87 The authors also note that the lTC, by contrast, "has 
been deferential to CIT decisions and has attempted to incorporate in 
83. Peter O. Such man, A Cost-Benefit Examination ,!/Trade Cases in an Era 'If Austerity: An Outline 'If 
the Problem and Some Suggestions, Presentation to the 1992Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of 
International Trade 5 (Oct. 28, 1992) (on file with authors). 
84. !d. 
85. Toupin, supra note 81, at 138. 
86. David A. Hartquist et aI., Toward a Fuller Appreciation 'If Nonacquiescence, Collateral Estoppel, and 
Stare Decisis in the U.S. Court 'If International Trade, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 112 (1990-91). 
87. Id. at 113. 
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subsequent cases the holdings of the CIT on issues of basic statutory 
interpretation. "BS It is plausible that the CIT judges, reacting to 
Commerce's nonacquiescence in the court's decisions, either consciously 
or subconciously "retaliate" by remanding Commerce's determinations 
more willingly. 
A final reason the CIT may give greater deference to the ITC involves 
the practical matter of what happens to the determination when it is 
remanded. In short, a limited remand of an ITC determination may in 
some instances require the Commissioners to reconsider all issues, even 
those which were not identified by the court as in error, and to conduct 
an entirely new vote on all issues.89 This is in contrast to a Commerce 
remand, which does not require that Commerce reconsider the affirmed 
portions of the determination. It is conceivable that the CIT judges, 
seeking to avoid the situation where a remand of an ITC determination 
may change the outcome for reasons unrelated to correcting the error 
that the court has identified, and to avoid running afoul of the statute's 
policy for expedited review,90 are subconciously more lenient with the 
ITC than with Commerce. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the relevant statutes and legislative history provide no basis for 
the Court of International Trade to give greater deference to Interna-
tional Trade Commission antidumping determinations than to Depart-
ment of Commerce International Trade Administration determina-
tions, an empirical survey of the court's 268 antidumping decisions since 
1985 concludes that the court in fact gives slightly greater deference to 
the ITC. This article describes the survey and suggests that the court's 
differing treatment of the ITC and Commerce may be due to any 
number of reasons, among them the possibility the court perceives that 
the politically independent ITC renders its decisions more objectively 
than does the politically dependent Commerce. 
88. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
89. This occurs when the Commissioner or Commissioners who committed error are no longer 
at the Commission. See Toupin, supra note 81, at. 152 & n. 110 (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 2 
Ct. Int'l Trade 1,7,519 F. Supp. 911, 916 (1981». 
90. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text for statutory deadlines. 
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